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Abstract 
Crashes at level crossings are a major issue worldwide. In Australia, as well as in 
other countries, the number of crashes with vehicles has declined in the past years, 
while the number of crashes involving pedestrians seems to have remained 
unchanged. A systematic review of research related to pedestrian behaviour 
highlighted a number of important scientific gaps in current knowledge. The 
complexity of such intersections imposes particular constraints to the understanding 
of pedestrians’ crossing behaviour. A new systems-based framework, called 
Pedestrian Unsafe Level Crossing framework (PULC) was developed. The PULC 
organises contributing factors to crossing behaviour on different system levels as per 
the hierarchical classification of Jens Rasmussen’s Framework for Risk Management. 
In addition, the framework adapts James Reason’s classification to distinguish 
between different types of unsafe behaviour. The framework was developed as a 
tool for collection of generalizable data that could be used to predict current or future 
system failures or to identify aspects of the system that require further safety 
improvement. To give it an initial support, the PULC was applied to the analysis of 
qualitative data from focus groups discussions. A total number of 12 pedestrians who 
regularly crossed the same level crossing were asked about their daily experience 
and their observations of others’ behaviour which allowed the extraction and 
classification of factors associated with errors and violations. Two case studies using 
Rasmussen’s AcciMap technique are presented as an example of potential 
application of the framework. A discussion on the identified multiple risk contributing 
factors and their interactions is provided, in light of the benefits of applying a systems 
approach to the understanding of the origins of individual’s behaviour. Potential 
actions towards safety improvement are discussed. 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Level crossings are complex intersections 
Level crossings (LCs) are complex intersections where rail and road systems 
converge. At such intersections, road users are permitted to cross rail tracks when it 
is safe to do so (i.e. in the absence of an approaching train). There are two main 
categories of LCs according to the level of protection they provide to users. Passive 
LCs are equipped with static controls such as “STOP” or “GIVE WAY” road signs 
whilst active LCs, which are often riskier locations, are equipped with automatic 
controls such as red flashing lights or barriers. Based on feedback loops (top-down 
and bottom-up flow of information) between components, the ultimate objective of 
LCs’ performance is to ensure road users’ safe crossing through the rail tracks. At 
active LCs in particular, the system must provide enough and reliable information for 
the pedestrian to safely negotiate the crossing. Such information mainly consists of: 
raising the awareness of the crossing (e.g. LC approach signage); providing 
adequate physical characteristics of the crossing path (e.g. visibility, well defined LC 
quadrant); ensuring visibility and awareness of the warning controls and their 
purpose; raising awareness of the potential hazards at such crossings (e.g. risk of 
second train). Fatal crashes are more frequent at active LCs (characteristic of urban 
environments) than at passive (Australian Transport Council, 2010). Pedestrians are 
particularly vulnerable users of active LCs given the higher flow of pedestrian traffic 
in such areas (Cairney, 1992). Australia has widely deployed engineering 
interventions to improve pedestrian LC safety, such as automated pedestrian gates. 
However, despite such interventions pedestrian LC crashes still occur. 
1.2. Crashes at level crossings 
Despite a substantial decrease since the 1990s, the annual number of LC crashes 
worldwide remains unacceptably high (ATSB, 2012, Basacik et al., 2012, Evans, 
2012 and Werkman et al., 2012). Although not as frequent as other types of road 
traffic crashes, they are associated with greater potential for fatal outcomes for 
victims and are related to serious economic costs (Evans, 2012, Iorio et al., 
2012 and Werkman et al., 2012). Not only do crashes at LCs impede on the 
operation and effectiveness of both rail and road infrastructure, but they also result in 
significant economic costs due to railroad property damage, insurance payments and 
legal fees (Iorio et al., 2012 and Metaxatos and Sriraj, 2012). In 2003, a cost per 
crash was estimated to range from $180,000 (AUD) in urban areas to $430,000 
(AUD) in rural areas (Australian Transport Council, 2003). Data from the ATSB 
(2012) suggests that, similarly to data from the United States (Metaxatos and Sriraj, 
2012), the number of crashes involving vehicles has noticeably declined in the last 
decades (i.e. between 2003 and 2007), whereas there has not been a significant 
change in the number of crashes with pedestrians. 
1.3. Pedestrian behaviour at LCs 
In a review of the literature examining the extent to which the systems approach has 
previously been applied to the investigation of a broad range of LC issues, Read et 
al. (2013) found that more than 70% of all existing publications on safety at LCs 
focused on the understanding and reduction of drivers’ unsafe behaviour. Thus, only 
very limited information on the factors and conditions shaping pedestrians’ unsafe 
behaviour at LCs is currently available. We subsequently carried out an in depth 
review of the literature with a strong focus on pedestrians’ unsafe crossing. 
A number of keywords were used to identify publications relevant to: level crossings 
(i.e. level crossings; railway crossings; grade crossings; rail crossings); pedestrians 
(i.e. pedestrians; passengers; rail users; trespassers) and the rail industry more 
generally. The search was undertaken in the following electronic databases: Science 
Direct; EBSCOhost; Google and Google Scholar; HERDC (Higher Education 
Research Data Collection; Australia); and among researchers’ network (conference 
proceedings and publications). Only 23 relevant publications; up to and including 
2013 were identified. Four major gaps in the literature on pedestrian crossing at LCs 
emerged from the review of these papers (see Appendix A for detailed description): 
The influence from research on motorist’s behaviour. 
Consistent with the large majority of the existing publications being on motorists, the 
review of the contributing factors applicable to pedestrian unsafe crossing have often 
been based on research on drivers' behaviour at LCs or on road safety publications 
more generally. Literature reviews underpinning past studies include only a small 
number of publications on pedestrians’ behaviour at LCs. Moreover, there are 
publications which do not clearly report outcomes which apply to pedestrians versus 
motorists. The degree to which outcomes of driver focused literature can be inferred 
to pedestrians is unclear as the required skills and the corresponding constraints (e.g. 
legal, social) related to both types of users are different. 
• 
The availability and quality of occurrence data. 
In Australia and worldwide, the criteria for the classification of occurrence data are 
not always consistent between authorities and may include cases of suicide or 
trespass (i.e. walking across or along rail tracks at non designated crossing areas), 
which are known to have different precursors than transgressions at LCs (Evans, 
2012 and Meiers et al., 2012). Thus, outcomes based on such data are hardly 
applicable between countries and even between regions. In addition, such data is 
associated with a limited range of identifiable risk factors, and struggles to comment 
on the cognitive or motivational origins of behaviour. 
 
The lack of empirical research into the origins of unsafe behaviour. 
Instead of investigating the origins of unsafe crossing, studies often focus on 
providing frequencies of illegal behaviour or identifying high risk groups of users, and 
examine only a small number of key variables such as the observed reported 
efficacy and awareness of various controls (Basacik et al., 2012, Parker, 
2002 and Stewart et al., 2004) or else the efficacy of education and enforcement 
campaigns (Lobb et al., 2001, Lobb et al., 2003 and Sposato et al., 2006). One study 
demonstrates pedestrians’ likelihood of underestimating the speed of an 
approaching train as a result of a perception bias (Clark et al., 2013). Self-reported 
data from another study provides indication of the most relevant factors influencing 
decision-making of different types of users (Beanland et al., 2013). 
 
The lack of research on multiple interacting risk-contributing factors. 
Several authors have pointed to the advantages of investigating simultaneous 
interactions between multiple risk contributing factors as opposed to considering a 
single factors’ contribution in isolation (Iorio et al., 2012, Read et al., 
2013 and Werkman et al., 2012). 
High risk groups of users (i.e. young males) or times of the day (i.e. peak hours) 
have been predominantly associated with risky crossing along with a number of 
contributing factors such as: large groups of pedestrians, being in a hurry, inattention 
(distraction), sensation (thrill) seeking tendencies, status of the controls (closing vs. 
closed gates) or presence of a (visible) approaching train ( Beanland et al., 
2013, Clancy et al., 2007,Edquist et al., 2011, McPherson and Daff, 2005, Metaxatos 
and Sriraj, 2013, Searle et al., 2011 and Sposato et al., 2006). Davis Associated 
Limited (2005) are among the few who provided a classification of multiple factors 
influencing crossing behaviour, however they did not investigate the associations 
between different factors. In contrast, examining the interactions between various 
contributing factors Metaxatos and Sriraj (2013)showed that the presence and the 
larger number of pedestrian gates (i.e. at all LC quadrants) reduced the reported 
deliberate and observed (legal) violations independently of the train’s direction. They 
also reported an increase in violations with the increasing number of pedestrians in a 
group (i.e. alone vs. in a group of two vs. in a group of more than two) independently 
of the time of the day. Finally, even though a number of authors have recently 
recognised the need to consider characteristics of the socio-economic area (e.g. 
presence of schools, industrial buildings) as a key factor shaping behaviour, to our 
knowledge such results have not yet been demonstrated (Edquist et al., 2011). While 
initial steps have been made to undertake research considering LCs as a complex 
system, these are rare and even rarer still is pedestrian focused systems research. 
1.4. Systems approach 
Systems theory, rooted in natural sciences has further been applied to the 
improvement of safety in complex systems. The systems approach aims to look at 
the problem as a result of the interaction of all the system’s components, considering 
the whole as the unit of analysis, not just individual’s behaviour. The utility of a 
systems approach in identifying factors which contribute to different types of errors 
has been demonstrated in a variety of complex systems such as aviation and, most 
recently, in the railway domain (Hobbs and Williamson, 2003, Li et al., 2008, Maurino 
et al., 1995, Rail Safety Regulatorś Panel, 2009 and Read et al., 2012). Read et al. 
(2012) were pioneers in applying a systems approach to the investigation of the 
associations between system factors and types of unsafe behaviour in rail incidents 
and accidents. However, they excluded occurrences at LCs from the scope of their 
analysis, given the added complexity of interactions between components of the 
road and the rail system. 
With the fast pace of technological changes, there is a pressing urge to apply system 
models of safety and risk management to a broader range of domains (Hollnagel, 
2004 and Leveson, 2004). So far, a number of models have been developed and 
predominantly have been applied to, or underpinned accident analysis within 
complex systems: Rasmussen’s risk management framework and AcciMap 
(Rasmussen, 1997); Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model (Reason, 1997 and Reason et 
al., 1990); Nancy Leveson’s STAMP (Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and 
Processes, (Leveson, 2004); and the Safety through prevention and protection 
model (Hollnagel, 2004). While all of these models have emerged from the systems 
theory approach, each of them proposes a specific understanding of accident 
causation, investigation and prospective prevention. Traditional sequential and 
epidemiological models prioritise the analysis of the chain of events preceding an 
accident and are therefore considered inadequate to capture the dynamic nonlinear 
interactions between system components. Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model (1990, 
1997) for example, identifies latent system failures (e.g. inadequate procedures, 
decisions) which combined with active failures (errors) create conditions for 
accidents. However, it has been demonstrated that this model fails to explain how 
these factors are associated with the active failures and other system factors due to 
the static view of the state of the system (Johnson and Botting, 1999). In more recent 
models, accident causation is viewed as a complex network of nonlinear interactions 
between various levels of the system where decision-makers at higher system levels 
are considered as equally responsible for failures as frontline actors (Hollnagel, 
2004 and Leveson, 2004). For example, Jens Rasmussen’s AcciMap technique 
graphically illustrates the causal relationships between actions and decisions on 
higher system levels according to the information flow between different system 
components (Rasmussen et al., 2000). The risk contributing factors in an AcciMap 
are distributed over the six hierarchically organised system levels proposed in 
Rasmussen’s risk management framework. Another example is the Nancy Leveson’s 
STAMP approach seeking to explain accidents as failures to exercise control over 
concrete tasks contributing to the global system performance (i.e. safety constraints) 
(Leveson, 2004). The graphical representation of the STAMP technique is based on 
the identification of system constraints and causal factors associated with reasons 
for flawed control and dysfunctional interactions. 
Independently of the applied method, the detection of causal factors implies an in 
depth description of the current state of the system’s performance – a task implying 
serious methodological challenges. The system’s performance is subject to constant 
changes related to time passage, scientific advances or the outcomes of past events 
and occurrences (Dekker et al., 2011 and Leveson, 2011). The more the systems 
performance is dynamic and variable, the more actors’ behaviour becomes hard to 
predict. This is particularly true for open systems such as LCs – allowing interactions 
between systems’ internal elements and the environment. Pedestrian crossing 
behaviour is influenced by the system’s managing structures, by the actions and 
decisions of other independent actors (e.g. other pedestrians or motorists) and by a 
multitude of environmental characteristics (e.g. socio-economic and architectural 
characteristics of the urban and the narrower LC environment, weather and time 
conditions). Retrospective analysis of the relatively rare previous crashes is therefore 
limited in capturing risk factors at play in the specific circumstances and provides 
insufficient information about the current systems’ state and performance. At the 
same time, prospective analysis is better placed to consider and predict systems’ 
dynamics, although it would always be subject to changes over time and limitations 
related to the method of data collection and analysis (Dekker et al., 2011). 
1.5. Aims of the paper 
This paper aims to define a new tool for the better understanding of pedestrian’s 
behaviour accounting for the individual’s interaction with other system components. 
The framework is supported by well-known theories in psychology and systems 
approach methods. 
Given the infrequent nature of pedestrian crashes at LCs, the investigation of the 
links between precursors of behaviour and system factors would benefit from the use 
of prospective methods. In an effort to investigate the cognitive and motivational 
precursors of behaviour along with the contributing factors they are impacted by, a 
new system-based framework is proposed – “Pedestrian Unsafe Level Crossing 
framework” (PULC). In line with modern systems approach, this framework is also 
designed to be used in a prospective and predictive manner. 
2. Pedestrian Unsafe Level Crossing framework (PULC) 
2.1. Origins and Structure 
The proposed PULC framework is inspired by two key sources: the Contributing 
Factors Framework developed for the classification of contributing factors to rail 
accident occurrences (Rail Safety Regulatorś Panel, 2009), and which is based on 
James Reason’s Organisational accident causation model; and the Jens 
Rasmussen’s risk management framework. Elements from both models have been 
combined to highlight potential links between specific risk factors identified in the 
existing literature and unsafe behaviour according to its level of intentionality. The 
PULC identifies factors on four system levels and is tailored to the particular context 
of pedestrian crossing behaviour (Fig. 1). 
 
 Each level lists system components responsible for various safety constraints 
associated with corresponding risk-factors potentially contributing to unsafe crossing. 
Unlike the proposed classification of system levels in Jens Rasmussen’s model, in 
the PULC factors on the individual level (Pedestrian level) are distinguished from 
factors associated with the presence and behaviour of other actors in the immediate 
crossing context (Social environment). The Organisational and the Equipment and 
surroundings levels include components related to respectively systems’ 
management and physical environment. Based on the current knowledge, 
components on each level have been identified in relation to their potential influence 
on pedestrian behaviour. The associated risk-factors are likely to have an impact on 
different types of unsafe behaviour. 
We refer to James Reason’s classification of “unsafe acts” which builds upon Jens 
Rasmussen’s Skill, Rule and Knowledge based classification (SRK), to distinguish 
between errors and violations ( Reason et al., 1990). While errors result from failures 
on different levels of information processing (skill, rule, knowledge-based levels of 
performance) and are thus associated with cognitive precursors; violations 
emphasise on the role of social context in decision-making (e.g. social norms, rules, 
operating procedures) and are therefore associated with motivational factors which 
lead the person to intentionally deviate from the prescribed rules (Reason et al., 
1990). According toParker et al. (1995) errors are more likely to be minimised 
through “retraining, redesign of the human-machine interface, memory aids, better 
information”, whereas violations are more likely to be reduced by the modification of 
attitudes, norms, beliefs or the overall safety culture (p.1036). 
The arrows in Fig. 1 represent the complex interactions between components within 
and between system levels. However, despite their interconnectedness various 
authors have demonstrated that system factors of different nature contribute to a 
larger extent to either errors or violations (Hobbs and Williamson, 2003 and Read et 
al., 2012). 
Reason defines skill-based errors as actions which did not go as planned in 
automatic routine tasks requiring low attentional resources. In a LC context, such 
errors can be associated with internal or external distractions related to the 
perception or recognition of key elements in the LC environment (e.g. the activation 
of the automatic controls). Findings from previous studies have shown that the use of 
mobile devices while crossing alters pedestrians’ vigilance and thus contributes to 
such errors (Clancy et al., 2007 and Metaxatos and Sriraj, 2013). Moreover, Hobbs 
and Williamson (2003)demonstrated that skill-based errors in aircraft maintenance 
are associated with factors related to the use of equipment, equipment malfunctions 
and environmental characteristics. Therefore, in the context of crossing at LCs, skill-
based errors could be associated with risk-contributing factors on the Equipment and 
surroundings level. Such factors describe the characteristics of the LC environment 
(e.g. number of rail tracks, presence of controls), the larger urban area (e.g. key 
industrial and economic buildings within the area of the LC) or else, the temporal 
characteristics of the crossing moment (e.g. time of the day, weather conditions). 
Rule and knowledge based errors occur on the more conscious action-selection level. 
Rule-based errors occur in familiar situations when a person could misapply a good 
rule (e.g. assumptions: crossing is safe as long as there is not a visible train at active 
LCs) or apply a bad rule to a given situation (e.g. habits: crossing is perceived as 
safe as long as one train has passed even if the gates are not open). In contrast, 
knowledge-based errors describe failures related to a lack of information in novel 
situations. Thus, past experience (familiarity) would favour the formation of attitudes, 
strong expectations or habits likely to be associated with rule/knowledge based 
errors. In the context of crossing a LC, past experience would be associated with 
factors related to various laws, regulations and procedures governing the LC system 
(e.g. rail traffic management, enforcement, security, safety campaigns, road rules). 
In line with this assumption, Hobbs and Williamson (2003) demonstrated that risk 
factors associated with tasks requiring training, supervision, coordination or past 
experience with procedures were particularly associated with rule/knowledge based 
errors in aircraft maintenance. Within the PULC, factors related to the system’s 
management are identified within the Organisational level, encompassing four higher 
system levels adopted from Jens Rasmussen’s model. 
Violations originate under the influence of various psycho-social constraints (e.g. 
attitudes, norms, beliefs) attributing a given value (importance) to the behaviour or to 
more abstract goals, and are generally carried out in the belief that they will result in 
more positive than negative outcomes. Reason (1990) defines violations as 
underpinned by risk/benefit trade-offs (e.g. I can take the risk to cross in order to 
catch the next train). 
Goal attainment is a central concept in theories of self-regulation which explain 
individual’s conscious efforts to influence thoughts, feelings and behaviours towards 
the achievement of goals in a dynamic environment (De Ridder and De Wit, 2006). 
While theories of self-regulation offer different perspectives, they share the idea that 
goals direct behaviour and give meaning to people’s lives (Baumeister, 
1989). Carver and Scheier (2001) propose a model of self-regulation rooted in the 
long tradition of expectancy-value theories in psychology explaining the persistence 
of efforts towards a given goal as driven by the perception of favourable outcomes. 
Such behaviour is defined in this paper as “goal directed behaviour”. Having been 
widely applied in the domain of health and risk-taking, this model is based on the 
idea that goals differ in their level of abstraction and have a hierarchical structure. 
Goal directed behaviour can therefore explain risk-taking at LCs underpinned by the 
motivation of attaining higher level goals (e.g. “I need to violate the rules in order to 
be at work on time”). In this relation,Hobbs and Williamson (2003) demonstrated that 
time pressure was strongly associated with violations. In a LC context, Clancy et al. 
(2007) showed that 31% of survey pedestrians reported intentionally engaging in 
violations “to be on time” or to “catch a train”. Violations can also be explained by 
social influences (i.e. crossing for a dare, to be part of the group). Various authors 
have shown that the larger number of pedestrians crossing together increases risk-
taking propensity at LCs ( Khattak and Luo, 2011 and Metaxatos and Sriraj, 2013). 
Nevertheless, deliberate violations can and often are underpinned by precursors of 
errors. In familiar situations decision-making and specifically risk/benefit trade-offs 
are often influenced by past knowledge and experience which potentially contribute 
to the formation of expectations, attitudes towards safety procedures or perception of 
risk (see examples of quotes in Appendix B related respectively to Safety 
checks, Safety campaigns and Unsafe behaviour). 
3. Applying the PULC – a focus group study with pedestrians 
Focus group discussions with pedestrians who frequently use LCs were organised. 
Participants were invited to share their past experiences at LCs, perception of risk 
and safety issues, opinions and observations of other pedestrians’ behaviour. Such 
qualitative approach is a promising method to conduct explorative baseline studies 
on the identification of interactions between risk contributing factors within complex 
systems (Read et al., 2013 and Werkman et al., 2012). 
In the next sections, the method of the study and some of the results are described 
to illustrate how the framework might contribute to a better understanding of the 
system's dynamics. 
3.1. Method 
3.1.1. Participants 
Twelve participants between 16 and 75 years old (m = 42) took part in the focus 
groups. Two thirds of them were female (9/12). All were familiar with Wynnum 
Central LC. Participants reported also crossing LCs adjacent to Wynnum North train 
station (N = 3), Lindum train station (N = 1) and Cannon Hill train station (N = 1). All 
of these users were crossing from one to four times per day. 
Four focus groups were formed as follows: one group of younger pedestrians (16–
30); two groups of middle aged (31–55) and, one group of older pedestrians (56+). 
The focus groups had on average three participants per group. 
Participants were recruited via posters, inviting people who “regularly or occasionally 
walk through a level crossing” and are “over 15 years old”. Posters were distributed 
at train stations and LCs within and nearby the Wynnum area (Queensland, 
Australia), as well as at large shopping centres in a close proximity. The rationale for 
targeting a sample from this area is that the majority of the reported near-misses with 
pedestrians from 2011 took place on this particular rail line (42%), and specifically at 
the LC adjacent to Wynnum Central station (41%) ( Queensland Rail, 2012). 
3.1.2. Description of the frequented LCs by participants 
Wynnum Central is commonly frequented by all participants. It is equipped with 
active controls (flashing lights, barriers, a single pair of pedestrian lights and 
pedestrian gates on each side of the crossing) regulating pedestrian flow through the 
two rail tracks (Photograph 1). Some participants were also familiar with two other 
LCs (i.e. Cannon Hill and Lindum). These LCs differ from Wynnum Central as three 
rail tracks are separated by middle islands with active controls providing independent 
regulation of the pedestrian flow on each side. 
 
3.1.3. Materials 
The focus groups were semi-structured utilising open-ended questions that covered 
six main themes incorporating all elements identified in the PULC (see Appendix B). 
The first theme consisted of introductory questions about participants’ habitual 
crossing behaviour as a pedestrian (familiarity/frequency/purpose of crossing at 
concrete LC-site/s and knowledge about various aspects of crossing) and was 
simultaneously used as “breaking the ice” technique between participants. The 
remaining themes were discussed in each group in a non-systematic order. Each 
theme corresponded to a set of broad questions and probes developed beforehand 
to guide but not delimit the discussion. The second theme was developed to capture 
precursors of skill-based errors (e.g. absent minded behaviour, internal or external 
distractions, low vigilance). The third theme probed detailed description of unsafe 
crossing context and the explicitly provided causes (e.g. key elements of the 
environment, goal directed behaviour). Finally, the three last themes dealt with 
information on past experiences and attitudes, expectations and perceptions related 
to different aspects of: enforcement policies and procedures (e.g. likelihood to be 
penalised); education campaigns (e.g. exposure, perceived relevance, effectiveness); 
and general public safety awareness (e.g. perception of hazards or risks). It must be 
noted that because of ethical reasons, the last theme “Past occurrences at LCs” did 
not consist of pre-identified questions related to fatal occurrences. 
3.1.4. Procedure 
The aims of the study and privacy policies were explained to participants prior to the 
discussions. The sessions were conducted in a quiet environment, with groups of 
participants of similar age in order to enhance interactions and in particular the 
potential for sharing past illegal experiences (Yardley and Marks, 2004). Even 
though participants were asked to describe past crossing experiences they tended to 
talk more generally about their habitual safe or unsafe crossing. Probes based on 
five W-questions (“Who-have you done that?”; “When – could you describe the 
situation?”; “What – what happened exactly?”; “Why- was there any particular 
reason?”; “Where – where did this happen?”) were used to extend the discussion, 
provide clarifications and enhance the interaction between participants. Where 
possible (without interrupting the natural flow of the discussion), participants were 
asked to share their own knowledge, experience or opinions about topics raised by 
others. For example, if a pedestrian knew the exact amount of the sanction for illegal 
crossing – others were also explicitly asked. At the end of the discussion, all 
participants received an incentive for their time. 
3.2. Analysis 
Our analysis method was twofold. First, applying the PULC, factors potentially 
logically related to crossing behaviour and their interactions are identified. Second, 
two illustrative case studies of specific unsafe crossing occurrences are presented in 
AcciMaps format. 
3.2.1. Applying the PULC to identify and classify factors contributing to crossing 
behaviour 
STEP 1. Identification of units of analysis – Cases 
Two researchers combined all the verbal exchanges that related to a depicted 
distinctive “Case” of crossing behaviour or elements likely to influence behaviour. For 
a case to be considered, even if it included the interaction between multiple 
participants, it had to meet one of three criteria: 
• 
Description of a crossing or events occurred at a specific time and place. 
• 
Description of aspects of habitual behaviour (e.g. crossing before the 
pedestrian gates are closed). 
• 
Description of general aspects of the system’s properties (e.g. amount of the 
sanctions, existing safety campaigns) likely to influence behaviour. 
STEP 2. Categorisation of the profile of participants 
Participants’ crossing profile was evaluated according to quantifiers identified in the 
verbatim informing on the frequency that a given behaviour was undertaken. 
Pedestrians who did not report any previous unsafe crossing were assigned to “safe 
crossing profile”. Error and violation profiles were assigned to pedestrians who 
reported at least one risky crossing experience. In this sample, all three participants 
who reported errors did not report any violations. 
STEP 3. Coding of factors potentially influencing crossing behaviour 
This coding was based on four variables: 
• 
Factor: any reference to a rationale, information or explanation regarding 
crossing behaviour or intentions. Two researchers used the pre-established 
categories of risk factors in the PULC as a first list for screening the case 
content. Multiple factors were identified within each case considering the 
wider context of the narratives. With the aim to detect a wide range of factors 
instead of quantifying their importance or prevalence, each was coded only 
once in relation to a given behaviour independently of the number of times or 
the number of participants it was mentioned by among all focus groups. 
• 
Actor (engaged in crossing): self (participant reporting own 
behaviour) vs. others (participant reporting observed behaviour). 
• 
Type of behaviour: safe crossing vs. error. vs. violation. 
• 
Nature of unsafe crossing: past experience (own, observed or information 
about an occurrence/behaviour) vs. hypothetical experience (expressed 
crossing likelihood for the self or others). 
Factors identified within cases describing aspects of crossing (but not behaviour) 
were associated with safe behaviour, errors or violations according to the crossing 
profile of the participant. However, if for example a pedestrian assigned to error 
profile was talking about a hypothetical violation - then the factor was only 
associated with “hypothetical violation”. 
Finally each factor was associated with at least one and a maximum of ten different 
behaviours according to their type (safe vs. error vs. violation), their nature 
(past vs.hypothetical experience) and the actor (self vs. others). 
STEP 4. Classification of the factors within the pre-identified categories at 
each level of the PULC framework 
The researchers used a bottom-up process to group similar factors together and 
organised them in categories of risk factors corresponding to system components 
within the PULC framework. A more detailed list of risk factors were identified thus 
extending the proposed categories in the PULC. For example, factors related to 
“Active controls” and “Passive controls” were organised in separate categories as 
being likely to influence different cognitive and motivational precursors. While signs 
are likely to be overlooked, audible alarms or pedestrian gates’ activation would 
more likely be misinterpreted than unnoticed. 
STEP 5. Coding of the interactions for each factor on the Pedestrian level with 
other system factors 
Finally, for each factor on the Pedestrian level one or two interactions (i.e. logical 
relationships) with other factors on the same or other system levels were identified. 
Only the system level of the identified interacting factors was taken into 
consideration (e.g. a factor within Goal directed behaviour category interacting with a 
factor on the Equipment and surroundings level). For each interaction, the number of 
behaviours accounting for the type, the actor and the nature of behaviour was 
counted. Three researchers participated in the coding process, discussed and 
resolved any discrepancies in opinions. 
3.2.2. Illustration of concrete relations between interacting factors and precursors of 
behaviour utilising the AcciMap technique 
To illustrate concrete relationships between precursors of behaviour and multiple 
factors on various system levels we adopted Jens Rasmussen’s AcciMap technique, 
which has previously been applied to the investigation of the contributing factors to 
unintentional non-compliance at LCs (Salmon et al., 2013). The AcciMap analysis 
allowed representing the causal relationships between factors on the lower system 
levels and the implied contribution of factors from the higher Organisational level. 
The contribution of the latter was inferred as pedestrians were unlikely to provide 
information on organisational factors. Instead, exchanges with industry partners and 
rail experts allowed discerning governmental and industrial structures on each 
system level corresponding to the identified system components in the PULC 
framework. Thus, the inferred factors were assigned to each system level and 
category of factors in the AcciMap illustrations. 
Each AcciMap included risk-factors within the four higher system levels as per Jens 
Rasmussen's model associated with specific organisational structures governing in 
Queensland and Brisbane area and likely to be responsible for the inferred risk-
contributing factors. The typical Rasmussen’s level “Physical processes and actor 
activities”, which normally incorporates decisions and actions of frontline actors in 
the chain of events prior to the critical event (accident) was, for the purpose of this 
study and corresponding to the structure of the PULC, split into “Pedestrian level” 
and “Social environment level”. Consistent with the adopted approach, this 
separation allowed the inclusive investigation of the origins of pedestrian behaviour 
taking into consideration influences from the surrounding social environment. 
3.3. Results 
Results are organised in three sections. First, descriptive statistics on the frequency 
and the types of unsafe behaviour are presented. Second, the classification of 
factors across system levels is presented followed by a discussion of the interacting 
factors associated with each type of behaviour. Finally, two case studies of violations 
are presented in AcciMaps format. 
3.3.1. Reported unsafe behaviour and perceptions of high risk groups of users 
Eight out of the twelve participants mentioned at least one crossing experience 
which could be considered unsafe, the majority being reported by daily users 
(N = 6/8). Considering each age group, unsafe behaviour (N = 7/8) was mostly 
associated with younger (16–30 years old) and middle aged (31–55 years old) 
participants, while older adults (56+ years old) were most likely to report safe 
behaviour (N = 2/4). 
Three crossing experiences associated with errors were identified in each age group 
of participants: one was inferred as such by the researchers and the others were 
recognised by the pedestrians after crossing. The three errors were classified as: a 
rule-based error (i.e. pushing the entry pedestrian gate while it had already started 
opening); a skill-based error (i.e. the participant failed to identify the activation of a 
second pair of pedestrian lights at a middle island); and a knowledge-based error (i.e. 
the participant was not aware of the presence of an emergency pedestrian gate 
during a first crossing experience in the country). In contrast, five younger and 
middle aged participants reported violations – deliberate crossing during active 
controls' activation, and being aware of the illegal nature of such behaviour. 
Finally, within each participant’s narrative we identified words and phrases 
describing other pedestrians as high at risk groups of users. All age groups of 
participants perceived younger pedestrians as high risk groups of users, even 
though some participants also suggested that school children tend to cross safely. 
Middle age participants were most likely to perceive older adults (elderly) as a high 
risk group, while only older adults did not perceive their age group as being at risk. 
3.3.2. The applied PULC 
After the coding, 298 factors were identified across all levels of the PULC. The 
Pedestrian level cumulated the largest number of identified factors distributed in 12 
categories. The Environment and surroundings level comprised factors classified in 
10 categories. The least number of factors were found on the Organisational and on 
the Social environment levels. Fig. 2 illustrates the distribution of factors within each 
category accounting for the number of factors associated at least once with safe 
crossing and/or error and/or violation (independently of whether the behaviour was 
hypothetical or past experience of the self or others). 
 
  
“The majority of the identified factors on each system level were associated with 
violations and the least number – with errors” (Table 1). The Pedestrian level 
accounted for the largest number of identified factors. These factors were organised 
within categories corresponding to various cognitive and motivational precursors of 
behaviour. Factors within the Physical and mental states (e.g. impairments, emotions, 
moods),Crossing characteristics (e.g. crossing with earphones, carrying bags) 
and Safety checks categories were mostly associated with cognitive precursors 
of skill-based errors(11 out of 36). Factors within the Perception of 
risk, Attitudes, Past experience and knowledge and Expectations categories were 
mostly associated with cognitive precursors of rule/knowledge based errors (13 out 
of 36). Throughout the remainder of the analysis error types are considered together. 
Finally, factors within the Goal directed behaviour (e.g. time pressure, impatience 
with waiting times), Crossing and Journey context (e.g. going to 
work/school), Crossing trajectory (e.g. shortcuts, crossing on diagonal), Perception 
of deterrence and Perception of security categories were mostly associated with 
motivational precursors of violations. 
  
To further examine the influence of different system factors on the precursors of 
behaviour, in the following sections the interactions between factors within each 
category of the Pedestrian level and other factors on the same or other system levels 
are discussed in light of their association with either type of behaviour. 
3.2.2.1. Interactions between factors associated with safe crossing 
Among the 68 factors on the Pedestrian level associated with safe crossing (Table 1) 
five were found to interact with other factors on more than one system level. Thus a 
total number of 73 interactions associated with safe crossing were identified. Among 
these interactions 76 behaviours were counted, meaning that three of the 
interactions were associated with safe crossing reported both – for the self and for 
others . 
Fig. 3 illustrates the contribution of interacting factors which were associated with 
safe crossing most often, independently of whether they were associated with the 
participants’ own behaviour or with the behaviour of others. Among all categories on 
the Pedestrian level, the largest number of behaviours was associated with factors 
related toPast experience and knowledge, Expectations, Safety checks and 
Attitudes (68%). The majority of factors associated with safe crossing interact with 
other factors on the Equipment and surroundings level (51%) and to a smaller extent 
with factors on the Organisational and the Pedestrian levels. Influences from the 
social environment were least mentioned in relation to this type of behaviour. 
 
Fig. 3.  
Illustration of interactions mostly associated with safe crossing. 
Legend: Arrows illustrate the interactions most frequently associated with safe crossing; 
N = the number of safe behaviours identified: (1) within each category of factors on the 
Pedestrian level; (2) in interaction with other factors on each system level. 
Factors on the Equipment and surroundings level were found to influence a large 
number of cognitive precursors of behaviour such as perception of risk, familiarity, 
attitudes and expectations but also motivational precursors. Among the cognitive 
precursors, knowledge about characteristics of the LC environment and rail traffic 
(e.g. the platform’s height, the number of rail tracks, the angle or the distance to an 
approaching train) was often associated with an estimation of risk preceding the 
crossing decision (e.g. “If it was touch and go I wouldn’t risk it”). Familiarity with 
active controls was associated with low likelihood of missing the controls' activation 
(e.g. the audible alarm can be heard before the gate system is active). In relation to 
this, participant's perception of risk appeared to be associated with checks for the 
status of the pedestrian gate or with checks for a visible approaching train. Among 
the motivational precursors, journey contexts were mentioned in relation to 
characteristics of the urban and the LC environment. For example safe crossing was 
associated with a goal of crossing the road instead of crossing to catch a train, but 
also with crossing in order to catch a train for leisure as well as for work. 
Factors on the Organisational level seemed to contribute as well to the formation of 
attitudes and expectations and enhanced familiarity and knowledge about different 
aspects of the system’s performance (cognitive precursors). For example, safe 
crossing was associated with: attitudes towards the amount of the sanction for illegal 
crossing; expectations based on others’ experience with sanctions, expectations 
based on familiarity with train timetables; or else, awareness of previous occurrences 
or safety campaigns. Specifically, participants crossing safely expressed 
expectations that more express trains (not stopping at station) pass in the morning. 
The influence of factors of the Social environment level mainly described crossing 
motivated by social influences. Specifically, safe crossing was associated with 
crossing with family (e.g. crossing with baby or with a partner) and crossing among 
random other pedestrians (e.g. not following other pedestrians). Moreover, crossing 
with known others was associated with more safety checks, whereas crossing 
among random others – with less. Finally, the interactions between factors within the 
Pedestrian level often described the relationship between past experience and 
perception of risk (i.e. knowledge about previous occurrences was associated with 
increased perception of risk). 
3.3.2.2. Interactions between factors associated with errors 
Among the 27 factors on the Pedestrian level associated with errors, four interacted 
with factors on two different system levels. Thus, in total 31 interactions were 
identified associated with 34 different behaviours. In other words, in three cases the 
same interaction was associated with more than one error. There were slightly more 
behaviours related to participants’ own past experience or likelihood to commit an 
error (59%) than were for others. 
Fig. 4 illustrates the interactions between factors mostly associated with errors 
reported for the self (solid arrows) and with errors reported about others (dashed 
arrows). Among the categories of factors on the Pedestrian level, more than half of 
the identified errors (62%) were distributed between Past experience and 
knowledge, Physical and mental states and Crossing characteristics. The largest 
percentage of factors associated with errors interacted with other factors on the 
Equipment and surroundings level (41%) and the least percentage–with factors of 
the Organisational level (12%). 
 Fig. 4.  
Illustration of interactions mostly associated with errors reported for the self and for other. 
Legend: Solid arrows correspond to interactions most frequently associated with participants’ 
recognised errors or likelihood to commit errors; dashed arrows: correspond to interactions 
most frequently associated with knowledge or opinions about others’ likelihood to commit 
errors: N = the number of errors identified: (1) within each category of factors on the 
Pedestrian level; (2) in interaction with other factors on each system level. 
Figure options 
Factors associated with participants' previous recognised errors and perceived 
likelihood to commit an error, were mainly identified among the following categories 
of contributing factors: Past experience and knowledge, Attitudes and Goal directed 
behaviour and were interacting with other factors on the Organisational, the 
Pedestrian and the Equipment and surroundings levels. These interactions suggest 
that the likelihood of committing an error can be associated with less than adequate 
performance of rail staff (e.g. station masters do not act upon signalled problems) or 
else, with inadequate characteristics of the passive and active controls (e.g. 
frustration to wait for pedestrian gates to open, abundance of passive signs). The 
lack of previous experience at LCs, infrequent crossing and familiarity with more than 
one LC, were also associated with errors. Thus, the reported for the self past 
experience and likelihood to commit an error was associated with failures on the 
rule/knowledge based level of performance and even with goal directed behaviour. 
On the contrary, participants’ perception of the likelihood of others to commit an error 
was predominantly associated with Physical and mental states and social influences, 
both hampering the capacity to detect the controls’ activation (e.g. 
hearing/visual/motor impairments, absent-minded behaviour, alcohol intoxication, 
crossing among a large group of pedestrians). Thus, unlike the factors associated 
with participants’ own behaviour, reporting on others’ behaviour was more likely to 
be associated with skill-based errors. 
3.3.2.3. Interactions between factors associated with violations 
The largest number of interactions (N = 165) was found for factors at the Pedestrian 
level associated with violations (N = 139, Table 1). Among all factors associated with 
violations, 26 were in interaction with other factors on two different system levels. 
Moreover, these interactions were mostly associated with more than one behaviour 
(i.e. reported past experience and/or hypothetical behaviour for the self and/or for 
others). In total 275 violations were identified, with the majority associated with 
participants' own reported behaviour (68%, solid arrows) than with the observed or 
hypothetical behaviour of others (dashed arrows) (Fig. 5). 
 
Fig. 5.  
Illustration of interactions mostly associated with violations reported for the self and for others. 
Legend: Solid arrows correspond to interactions most frequently associated with participants’ 
reported past experience or likelihood to commit violations. Dashed arrows correspond to 
interactions most frequently associated with knowledge or observed behaviour of others 
clearly intentionally violating or with the perceived likelihood of others to commit violations. 
N = the number of violations identified: (1) within each category of factors on the Pedestrian 
level; (2) in interaction with other factors on each system level. 
Figure options 
While the largest number of violations (21%) was identified within the Past 
experience and knowledge category, factors within the following categories were 
associated with more violations per interaction: Goal directed behaviour, Crossing 
and Journey context, Crossing trajectory, Perception of deterrence and Perception of 
risk. Most violations, in total and per interaction, were associated with interacting 
factors on the Pedestrian and the Equipment and surroundings levels. Interacting 
factors on the Organisational level accounted for the least number of violations, 
however they were associated with more violations per interaction. On the contrary 
interacting factors on the Social environment level were associated with least 
behaviours per interaction although the total number of behaviours was higher. 
Violations reported for the self and associated with motivational precursors were 
identified within the following categories Goal directed behaviour, Crossing 
trajectoryand Crossing and journey context and were in interaction with other factors 
on the Pedestrian and the Equipment and surroundings levels. More than half of 
them concerned a reported likelihood to commit a violation (52%) than past 
experience. These interactions described violations motivated by a fear of missing a 
train to (to work/school), unwillingness to wait for the lights at a nearby road traffic 
intersection, time pressure or impatience (e.g. shortcuts, diagonal). They were 
associated with various aspects of the LC and the larger urban environment, with rail 
traffic characteristics and with time and weather conditions. For example violations 
were associated with crossing after shopping, at any time of the day or out of peak 
hours, in the presence of a stopped train at station, or else when it‘s raining. 
Interactions with other factors on the Pedestrian level described goal directed 
behaviour underpinned by positive attitudes (e.g. “pushing the pedestrian [entry] gate 
open is quicker and more efficient”). 
Violations reported for the self were also associated with cognitive precursors 
corresponding to factors within the Past experience and knowledge, Attitudes and 
Expectations categories. These behaviours seemed to be influenced by other factors 
on the Organisational and the Equipment and surroundings levels. Logically they 
were more associated with past (71%) than hypothetical experience. For example, 
violations were related to: awareness of the absence of locks on pedestrian entry 
gates, poor knowledge about the existence of pedestrian lights; awareness of 
second train arrival; familiarity with the platform, the larger area and with more than 
one LC. The large majority of the violations associated with low perception of risk 
(71%) interacted with other factors of the Equipment and surroundings level (e.g. 
presence of stopped train, distance of approaching train, prior to closure of the 
pedestrian entry gate). 
Various cognitive and motivational precursors were associated with violations 
reported as other pedestrians’ observed or hypothetical behaviour, and were 
logically interacting with other factors of the Social environment level. These 
interactions described the perception of high risk groups of pedestrians. For example, 
they were associated with negative Attitudes (e.g. people are stupid, crossing for a 
dare is useless) or else, with a decreased Perception of risk compared to others’ 
crossing behaviour (e.g. younger are unaware of the risk, younger are more at risk 
crossing for a dare, elderly with disabilities are more at risk, confident and people 
wearing high heels are more at risk). Contrary to participants' own behaviour, their 
perception of others’ goal directed behaviour was associated with social influences 
and more specifically with sensation seeking tendencies (i.e. for a dare, to show up). 
3.4. AcciMaps of two case studies illustrating interactions between factors on 
different system levels 
Two crossing scenarios in which pedestrians reported violations at Wynnum Central 
LC were chosen because they involved a large number and different nature of 
factors from multiple system levels and were therefore considered as suitable to 
illustrate the potential use of the PULC. 
3.4.1. Case study 1 
The first case study identifies the risk contributing factors resulting in a violation 
against a closed pedestrian entry gate. AcciMap 1 (Fig. 6) shows the interaction 
between these factors playing a role in the decision, whilst being aware that an 
approaching train has been announced to pass through the LC. 
 
 This particular crossing experience was reported by one participant – a 30-year-old 
female. She was on her way to Wynnum Central train station to catch a train home 
after shopping for groceries at a nearby supermarket. Evidence from the focus 
groups reveals that this is a commonly adopted trajectory by pedestrians, the LC 
being connected to a main road giving access to a nearby shopping centre, whereas 
an overpass is provided at the opposite LC and main road side end of the platform. 
Issues associated with the planning of the LC and overpass access points can 
therefore be inferred. According to the participant, her main reason for engaging in 
the particular crossing behaviour was the presence of a train already stopped at 
station. Crossing with her child, grocery bags, “school bag”, “university bag”, the 
participant ran to the platform, following the pedestrian path, she was unwilling to 
wait for the next train. As reported, she regularly crosses in identical situations (“I do 
it all the time...”). 
Such repetitive behaviour could be attributed to a low perception of risk or 
deterrence. Indeed, although not reported in relation to this particular crossing 
situation, the participant showed a low perception of risk associated with her 
familiarity with the LC environment: “I know the platform really well so if it was 
somewhere I haven’t been before I couldn’t gauge how far it (the approaching 
train) was if I didn’t know how long the platform was” or with her (self-reported) “risk-
taking” tendencies (“I’m a risk taker”). A link was also established with pedestrians’ 
reported lack of previous experience with sanctions: “see I do it all the time and I 
never got caught”. This could be influenced by failures on the higher system levels to 
adequately plan or implement enforcement strategies (e.g. inadequate or limited 
enforcement staff presence or schedules). Queensland Rail – “QR” (Technical and 
organisational management level) for example shares the responsibility to provide 
enforcement with the State Police (State policy and budgeting level). Budgetary 
issues could impede on the appropriate implementation of enforcement strategies 
and procedures on both levels. 
Participant’s perception of risk can be also attributed to issues related to the design 
of the station platforms and the larger station environment (i.e. access to the platform 
through the LC). Moreover, the participant expressed positive attitudes related to the 
ease of pushing the pedestrian gates open (i.e. absence of locks): 
“It’s quicker and its more efficient just to push through the gates and run…its faster”. 
Thus, the technical properties of the automatic controls might enhance pedestrians’ 
intentions to violate. However, the implementation of new and more intricate controls 
would be constrained by the budget on the Technical and operational management 
level as well as on the State government level. 
3.4.2. Case study 2 
The second AcciMap (Fig. 7) represents a violation at the same Wynnum Central LC, 
which resulted in legal consequences for the participant. In this crossing situation, 
the pedestrian–a 55-year-old woman pushed the entry pedestrian gate open to catch 
a train on her way to work. The choice of trajectory (crossing the LC instead of taking 
the overpass) was here again a matter of the shortest path. However in this case, 
the pedestrian parked her car closer to the LC avoiding a car park (giving access to 
the overpass) where she had previously observed aggressive behaviour and 
therefore considered as unsafe location. 
 
 
Fig. 7.  
Accimap 2 – illustration of crossing context where a pedestrian receives a fine for a violation on their 
way to work. 
Legend: LTA – less than adequate. 
 
During the violation, she was issued a fine together with a young man crossing at the 
same time from the opposite side of the LC. Both pedestrians received the fines from 
undercover QR officers (transit officers). The main reported reason for crossing was 
the lack of locking mechanism on the pedestrian gates: “it’s easy to open they don’t 
lock the gate – it’s easy to push and go”. Here again, the technical configuration of 
the pedestrian gates was explicitly associated with increased likelihood to violate. 
The woman refers to pedestrian gates providing access to a different train station 
(Lota) which lock and cannot be opened, enhancing safe crossing. In addition to the 
ease of pushing the gate, the crossing decision in this situation could be linked to the 
expressed strong perception of control (e.g. “but I had time,see this is the danger, 
people are pushing the gate - so Lota they have a locking mechanism”). Similarly to 
Case study 1, the perception of control in this situation could be explained by a low 
perception of risk or deterrence. However, in this case the pedestrian demonstrated 
a good knowledge about the regular presence of QR officers and associated this 
violation with a failure to recall this information (e.g. “I know, at 7.30 they are always 
there every 3 months… and I forgot that they are here… I haven’t see them for a 
long time”), noting that the pedestrian recalled the exact time of when she was 
issued the fine (7.30 am). 
In addition to exploring cognitive and motivational precursors of behaviour, Fig. 
7provides the opportunity to explore the extent to which they are influenced by the 
negative consequences of the action (i.e. receiving a fine). Specifically, the self-
reported data post violation provides information on the effects of enforcement 
measures. The pedestrian reported a reinforced perception of deterrence (e.g. “I’ll 
never do it again, I look at the station make sure they… I’ll never do it again”), but 
also a maintained perception of control over the situation. In fact, according to QR 
policies, in addition to the sanction for illegal crossing transit officers are informing 
pedestrians on the risks of such behaviour. After having this discussion with 
enforcement officers, the pedestrian seemed to maintain a stronger perception of 
control than of deterrence. 
“yes they told me that I shouldn’t be doing this, you know, and it’s dangerous, you 
know and, that I could be, you know killed and all that, but old people got killed 
cause they are slow-walking, or they can’t hear. There was one lady she couldn’t 
hear so the gate is very important it should be locked” 
Arguably her perception of control was associated with a greater perception of risk 
for others than for herself in a similar situation (i.e. activated controls). She 
mentioned a specific past fatal occurrence at Wynnum Central train station 6 years 
prior to the focus group discussion. This collision was well known among multiple 
participants across focus groups, being widely covered by local media and discussed 
among community members (as indicated by participants). It appeared to have 
generated a lasting perception that elderly pedestrians are a high-risk group of LC 
users, due to their limited motor, visual or hearing capacities. It is worth noting that 
the exact reasons for this past occurrence are unknown1. Nevertheless, participants 
in the focus groups tended to explain the “old lady’s fatality” in terms of impairments 
rather that statements or opinions as to whether she was aware or not of the risk she 
had taken (i.e. following a group of younger pedestrians pushing through the closed 
pedestrian gates). This is why it can be argued that this tragic past experience had 
more weight on the formation of crossing decisions than the educative discussion 
provided by enforcement officers. 
4. Discussion 
The conducted literature review on pedestrian crossing behaviour at LCs highlighted 
significant gaps in knowledge about the cognitive and motivational precursors of 
unsafe crossing and the associated multiple risk-contributing factors. To address 
these gaps, a system-based model called PULC (Pedestrian Unsafe Level Crossing 
framework) is proposed for the investigation of errors and violations at active LCs. 
This framework presents an extended view of various components of the system 
linked to cognitive and motivational precursors of behaviour (safe crossing, errors 
and violations). The PULC was applied to the analysis of qualitative data obtained 
from focus group discussions culminating in a detailed classification of factors 
derived from the descriptions of participants' safe and unsafe crossing. The 
classification facilitated the description of interactions between factors across system 
levels and moreover the examination of their role in the emergence of errors and 
violations. To our knowledge, this is the first study to provide an indication on the 
importance of groups of interacting factors according to their association with past 
and hypothetical violations reported for the self and for others. 
Among the twelve focus groups participants, three had previously committed errors, 
five reported violations and the remaining four only declared safe crossing behaviour. 
Independently of the small number of participants, the broad discussions allowed 
information to be recorded relating to the observed crossing behaviour of others. The 
results presented here presented are used as an illustration of the application of the 
framework and cannot be considered as representative of the general population. 
The analysis of the results on the interacting factors showed that factors on the 
Equipment and surroundings level are the most associated with each of the three 
types of crossing behaviour. Factors on the Organisational level were least 
associated with errors, whereas factors on the Social environment were least 
associated with safe crossing. 
Safe crossing was more commonly adopted by older participants and infrequent 
users of LCs. It appeared to be predominantly associated with knowledge about 
previous near-miss or fatal occurrences. Safe crossing was also associated with 
cues in the environment impeding on the emergence of error-prone conditions (e.g. 
audible alarms) or influencing safe crossing decisions (e.g. train position, angle of 
visibility, tracks and platform characteristics). These results suggest that participants 
tend to perceive themselves as unlikely to commit errors, and moreover that their 
crossing decisions are rather associated with a perception of risk than with legal 
constraints. These results are consistent with previous findings, suggesting that 
pedestrians rely on the audible alarms to gauge a train's approach (i.e. controls’ 
activation), but on the contrary – judge whether to cross according to the visibility of 
the approaching train (Beanland et al., 2013). 
The identified errors were distributed evenly across all three age groups of 
participants. A similar number of factors were associated with errors referring to 
participants' own behaviour and to the behaviour of others. The small number of 
factors associated with errors is not surprising given that pedestrians might not be 
aware of their previous errors. Nevertheless, the findings allowed for the 
identification of potential failures of the system likely to create error-prone conditions. 
An identified rule-based error was associated with a participant pushing an opening 
entry gate to enter the LC after a train had passed not being aware of the illegal 
nature of such behaviour. In fact, according to information from pre-observations at 
this particular crossing site (Wynnum Central) and other LCs in Queensland, the 
precise opening moment and time required for the entry gate to fully open could vary 
among pedestrian gates at different LC angles. These technical characteristics of the 
automatic mechanisms might create conditions for rule-based errors, and influence 
pedestrians’ perception of risk in a long term (i.e. expectations that the gate would 
take longer to start opening after a train had passed and thus pushing it open when it 
is still closed). Moreover, their trust in the equipment might be altered, especially at 
middle islands where pedestrian crossing is regulated separately on both sides of 
the island. They could also induce confusion and misinterpretation of the road rules if 
crossing seem to be prohibited at one LC angle and not at others due to 
discrepancies in the opening times. This result raises a question about the 
availability and the clarity of information about road rules for pedestrians. It 
underlines the importance of the homogeneity of the technical properties between 
active controls in the same geographical region. It also demonstrates the need for 
future similar and more in depth research specifically targeting the understanding of 
factors which lead to errors. In fact, most of the factors associated with errors 
reported for the self (rule-knowledge based) interacted with similar factors related to 
the technical and physical characteristics of active and passive controls and with 
familiarity with the LC environment. Therefore, arguably greater effort needs to be 
channelled towards improving the LC environment in a way that more information 
towards safe crossing is provided to users. In particular, more information about the 
purpose and the safe use of pedestrian gate systems (especially at LCs including 
middle islands) and presented in a more succinct manner (i.e. avoid abundance of 
passive signs) targeting the particular population of pedestrians (i.e. avoid 
confusions with road rules for motorists) would be likely to contribute to the reduction 
of errors. Finally, this result underlines the utility of the system approach to the 
detection of issues resulting from the dynamics of the LC system. Further research, 
should consider focusing on the investigation of the precursors of different types of 
errors. 
Violations were most common with frequent LC users who were either younger or 
middle aged. The reported violations and likelihood of engaging in such behaviour 
were to a large extent associated with goal directed behaviour and were closely 
related to characteristics of the LC environment. A larger percentage of the violations 
associated with goal directed behaviour referred to hypothetical crossing, which 
could explain future risk-taking intentions (e.g. “I would cross if the train is far away”). 
Thus, risk-taking intentions appeared to be underpinned by previous unsafe 
experience associated with positive outcomes, and to be highly dependent on the 
perception of key elements in the physical environment. 
The importance of aspects of the environment to the decision to violate was also 
illustrated in both case studies (AcciMaps). Specifically, the absence of locking 
mechanism on pedestrian gates could be a decisive element contributing to 
violations. While in past research, pedestrian gates were found to reduce unsafe 
crossing to a greater extent compared to other safety controls, it seems that the 
technical properties of such measures could play a crucial role to safety (Metaxatos 
and Sriraj, 2013). Arguably, there is a need to be sensitive to contextual differences 
across jurisdictions when interpreting other research. In relation to this, the Applied 
PULC framework controls for a rather exhaustive list of factors if the same behaviour 
is to be compared between two different populations and/or territories. 
In addition to goal directed behaviour, reports of one's own violations were also 
associated with attitudes, knowledge and expectations related to different aspects of 
organisational factors such as safety campaigns or enforcement procedures. Such 
interacting factors were often related to knowledge about others’ behaviour 
associated with low perception of risk with regards to own behaviour (e.g. “younger 
pedestrians only receive warning”, so I am not at risk) as illustrated in the second 
case study (AcciMap 2). Thus, violations underpinned by precursors of 
rule/knowledge based errors and based on the observation of others' behaviour 
could potentially be mitigated through actions at the Organisational level targeting 
the improvement of various procedures, and strategies (i.e. changes in enforcement 
procedures, rail staff training, and safety campaigns targeting specific age groups of 
pedestrians). 
The presence and behaviour of other pedestrians was not associated with self-
reported violations. However, in line with past research, crossing among others was 
associated with decreased safety checks. Violations among a large number of 
pedestrians could be explained by an increased distraction or by a “diffusion of 
responsibility” – a psychological phenomenon rooted in the theories of social 
influences describing the delegation of responsibility in the presence of others 
executing the same task. Explaining taking risks in road safety, the diffusion of 
responsibility has been demonstrated byHarrell (1991) who found that pedestrians' 
cautiousness is reduced in the presence of others crossing on the opposite road side. 
In this relation, a clear intention to violate in the presence of others in order to avoid 
being issued a fine was reported by one of the participants. Similarly, as illustrated in 
the second case study (AcciMap 2), the presence of another pedestrian crossing at 
the same moment might have influenced the crossing decision, provided that the 
participant expressed a perception of control after the infringement. Moreover, the 
participant expressed future intentions to look for enforcement officers before 
crossing, such statement being likely to explain a strategy to avoid violations only in 
the presence of enforcement officers. This finding highlights a potential need to 
adopt strategies towards the improvement of the working schedules of enforcement 
staff (i.e. avoiding repetitive appearance). 
Considering factors associated with the perception of the crossing behaviour of 
others, it could be argued that the large majority are influenced by a low perception 
of risk for the self compared to others. Unlike the reported errors in participants’ own 
behaviour, the perception of others’ likelihood to commit errors was associated with 
social influences (e.g. “following others blindly”). Similarly, the observed violations of 
other pedestrians were associated with negative attitudes and a perception of more 
at risk groups of users than the self, independently of whether it corresponded to 
their own age group or not. Such phenomenon in social psychology is known as 
“illusion of invulnerability” (i.e. comparative optimism, optimistic bias, unrealistic 
optimism) and refers to people’s tendency to perceive themselves as less likely to 
experience negative events than others (Harris and Middleton, 1994). Illusion of 
invulnerability could be explained by the perception of control and low perception of 
risk and has been associated with various types of risk-taking (i.e. smoking, health 
checks). Thus, to reduce such bias in the perception of the risk of crossing, the 
origins of the bias need to be further investigated in order to develop more effective 
safety measures. 
5. Conclusion, limits and perspectives 
This analysis and the results confirmed that focus group transcripts can be used to 
identify contributory factors of behaviour and in particular are a rich source of data 
pertaining to the lower system levels, which could be used to infer failures or 
necessary actions towards safety improvement to be taken on higher system levels. 
It is possible that the lack of higher level factors is an artefact of the focus group 
participants being non-rail expert end users of the LC. Future studies may wish to 
consider applying a similar technique to focus group discussions with rail employees 
and experts from influential organisations at the higher system levels. 
The factors associated with violations might be subject to a social desirability bias, 
omissions or a poor recall of the exact conditions under which the behaviour took 
place or the motivations that underpinned it. Even though in this data set participants 
logically reported factors influencing their recent or future behaviour, such evidence 
cannot be considered as describing the “current” state of the system because of its 
permanently changing and dynamic nature. However, such limitations are to a point 
compensated by the benefits of looking into multiple factors’ contribution to crossing 
behaviour, a hardly attainable objective by traditional methods such as crash 
investigation for example. 
In addition, the presentation of two case studies of unsafe crossing behaviour 
demonstrated how factors from different levels of the system interact to influence 
pedestrian crossing behaviour. This novel application of the AcciMap technique 
(Rasmussen, 1997) provided new insights into potential areas of weakness within 
the LC system which facilitate unsafe behaviour. For example, pedestrians’ decision 
to access the station from the LC seemed to be potentially correlated to inadequate 
planning of the station design considering the larger urban environment (i.e. location 
of overpass; security issues or convenience with regards to journey context). Future 
efforts could be concentrated on the redesign of the station environment and 
particularly to solutions providing pedestrians with direct (path of least resistance) 
access points to the LC. 
In addition, the use of AcciMaps demonstrated wider applications for this technique 
beyond traditional accident analysis. As shown by the current analysis, the same 
behaviour is likely to be underpinned by various precursors requiring different 
remedial measures. Therefore, AcciMaps linking cognitive and motivational 
precursors of behaviour to actions and decisions of frontline actors or higher level 
decision-makers would allow more specific description of (potential) issues and 
failures within the system and thus facilitate the identification of more specific actions 
towards safety improvement. 
The PULC could be further applied to the analysis of larger data sources allowing 
specialists from a wider range of areas (e.g. experts in social, engineering, marketing 
sciences) to collaborate towards the prevention of future incidents and the prediction 
of future problems. For example, this may be achieved by the development of 
simulation studies with the aim to predict and test the efficacy and/or potential issues 
of new safety measures taking into consideration the identified and inferred risk 
contributing factors. 
In conclusion, the current study provides evidence that pedestrian crossing 
behaviour at LCs is influenced by a wide range of factors from across the rail LC 
system. This cross system level influence on behaviour is in line with previous 
research at rail LCs (Read et al., 2013) and wider accident analysis (Rasmussen, 
1997 and Reason, 2008). The presented PULC framework provides new insight into 
explaining why unsafe acts are undertaken by pedestrians at LCs and can be used 
to propose more integrative future interventions to mitigate unsafe crossing 
behaviour. 
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